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    Problems of National Integration 
  Although 
    unified as a single nation at independence, the south and the north were, 
    from an institutional perspective, two separate countries. Italy and Britain 
    had left the two with separate administrative, legal, and education systems 
    in which affairs were conducted according to different procedures and in different languages. 
    Police, taxes, and the exchange rates of their respective currencies also 
    differed. Their educated elites had divergent interests, and economic 
    contacts between the two regions were
 virtually nonexistent. In 1960 the UN created the Consultative Commission 
    for Integration, an international board headed by UN official Paolo Contini, 
    to guide the gradual merger of the new country's legal systems and 
    institutions and to reconcile the
 differences between them. (In 1964 the Consultative Commission for 
    Legislation succeeded this body. Composed of Somalis, it took up its 
    predecessor's work under the chairmanship of Mariano.) But many southerners 
    believed that, because of experience gained under the Italian trusteeship, 
    theirs was the better prepared of the two regions for self-government. 
    Northern political, administrative, and commercial elites were reluctant to 
    recognize that they now had to deal with Mogadishu.
 At independence,
     the 
    northern region had two functioning political parties: the SNL, representing 
    the Isaaq clan-family that constituted a numerical majority there; and the 
    USP, supported largely by the Dir and the Daarood. In a unified Somalia, 
    however, the Isaaq were a small minority, whereas the northern Daarood joined members 
    of their clan-family from the south in the SYL. The Dir, having few kinsmen 
    in the south, were pulled on the one hand by traditional ties to the Hawiye 
    and on the other hand by common regional sympathies to the Isaaq. The 
    southern opposition party, the GSL, pro-Arab and militantly panSomali , 
    attracted the support of the SNL and the USP against the SYL, which had 
    adopted a moderate stand before independence.
 Northern misgivings about being too tightly harnessed to the south were 
    demonstrated by the voting pattern in the June 1961 referendum on the 
    constitution, which was in effect Somalia's first national election. 
    Although the draft was overwhelmingly approved in the south, it was 
    supported by less than 50 percent of the northern electorate.
 Dissatisfaction 
    at the distribution of power among the clanfamilies and between the two 
    regions boiled over in December 1961, when a group of British-trained junior 
    army officers in the north rebelled in reaction to the posting of higher 
    ranking southern officers (who had been trained by the Italians for police 
    duties) to command their units. The ringleaders urged a separation of north and south. Northern 
    noncommissioned officers arrested the rebels, but discontent in the north 
    persisted.
 In early 1962,
  GSL leader Husseen, seeking in part to exploit northern dissatisfaction, 
    attempted to form an amalgamated party, known as the Somali Democratic Union 
    (SDU). It enrolled northern elements, some of which were displeased with the 
    northern SNL representatives in the coalition government. Husseen's attempt 
    failed. In May 1962, however, Igaal and another northern SNL minister 
    resigned from the cabinet and took many SNL followers with them into a new 
    party, the Somali National Congress (SNC), which won widespread northern 
    support. The new party also gained support in the south when it was joined 
    by an SYL faction composed predominantly of Hawiye. This move gave the 
    country three truly national political parties and further served to blur 
    north-south differences. 
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